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ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
By 'Joseph 'J. Breche,.:-
Environmental lawyers often tell their clients that litigation 
should be attempted only as a last resort, yet they constantly 
find themselves before the courts. The reason is that the litiga-
tion process, despite some serious drawbacks, offers unique ad-
vantages. The courts are indispensable in emergencies. When all 
other political, administrative, and educational efforts have 
failed, and the bulldozers are poised to begin their work, only 
the courts can offer relief. They may issue a temporary injunc-
tion, halting an environmentally dangerous activity until a full-
fledged trial can be had. 
In order to invoke this drastic remedy, conservationists must 
make a convincing showing that continued activity will lead to 
severe environmental damage. To do this environmental lawyers 
must work closely with scientists. They must become thoroughly 
familiar with the technical data so that they can translate it into 
terms that will move reluctant judges to take momentous actions. 
In the Alaska Pipeline! and Cross-Florida Barge CanaP cases, 
the lawyers for the conservationists marshalled such impressive 
evidence of potential ecological dislocations that the courts 
stopped both projects, even though the developers had millions 
of dollars invested. 
Courtroom battles can be very dramatic. Forceful legal argu-
ment and hard-hitting cross-examination fires the imagination of 
the press and the public. Starting a lawsuit helps to dispel public 
cynicism and apathy by demonstrating in a highly visible way 
that it is possible to do something about pollution. An aroused 
public can then exert tremendous political influence. 
For example, a lawsuit revived flagging political efforts to 
stop a land-grab at Upper Newport Bay, California, the finest 
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remammg natural estuarine area on the Pacific coast. The 
county supervisors and the State Lands Commission had agreed 
to give away the priceless state-owned tidelands around the bay 
to a developer who planned to construct an expensive, privately 
owned resort community. In exchange, the State was to receive a 
nondescript upland area, two small bay access poin ts, and a new 
"waterway" that was to be created when several islands in the 
bay were excavated to provide fill for the shoreline development. 
The net result would have been to convert the bay from a mag-
nificen t wildlife refuge, open to all, in to a sterile, semi-private 
lake for the rich to enjoy. Publicity generated by the lawsuit3 
stimulated public outrage. Two of the supervisors who had sup-
ported the exchange were voted out of office and a third was 
forced to reverse his stand by public pressure. The Board re-
cently voted 5-0 to rescind the deal, and to instruct its counsel 
to switch sides in the suit. The vote came just in time, because 
there were indications that the judge was about to rule against 
the conservationists. 
Court proceedings give environmentalists their only effective 
chance to cross-examine polluters. Anyone who has observed 
political press conferences or government officials testifying at 
Congressional hearings realizes that it is impossible to get direct 
answers from reluctant politicians. Industry representatives can 
make themselves unavailable to the press or refuse to coment. 
More than six weeks after the massive San Francisco Bay oil 
spill of January 18, 1971, Standard Oil officials were still refusing 
to estimate the amount of oil spilled, despite intense pressure by 
the media and conservationists. But in the course of a law suit, 
at pre-trial depositions and at the trial, itself, environmental 
lawyers are entitled to cross-examine on any relevant subject 
and, in most cases, the witness can be compelled to give a direct 
answer. 
Skilled cross-examination can bring out the true beliefs of in-
dustrial spokesmen who claim they are concerned with environ-
mental quality. In the Storm King case,4 a United States Appeals 
Court reversed a decision by the Federal Power Commission to 
license a proposed pumped storage hydroelectric generating sta-
tion that would have destroyed the scenic qualities of a uniquely 
beautiful and historic part of the Hudson valley. It sent the case 
back to the Commission to "include as a basic concern the 
preservation of natural beauty," in deciding whether the plant 
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At the renewed FPC hearing, the power company's consultant-
on beauty, a landscape architect named Conover, enthusiastically 
touted his plan to transform the wild slope of Storm King Moun-
tain into a dreary "recreational area" surrounding the pumping 
machinery, complete with parking lots, headquarters buildings, 
picnic tables, grassy malls, and comfort stations. David Sive, 
one of the conservationists' attorneys, asked Conover whether he 
could conceive of any natural area that should be left wild, un-
touched by the works of man. Conover replied, "Personally, I 
think practically anything can be improved. In my past experi-
ence, I have not had any area which wasn't improved .... " 
Unguarded responses like this reveal far more accurately than 
slick public relations speeches and brochures the true measure of 
the electric power industry's regard for environmental quality. 
Litigation also places a very powerful weapon, "discovery," in 
the hands of environmental lawyers. The federal courts and most 
state courts have an elaborate set of pre-trial disclosure proce-
dures, called discovery, in which lawyers may examine their 
opponents' records, cross-examine their employees and other 
witnesses at depositions, and obtain formal written statements 
setting forth con ten tions of fact and, to some extent, the legal 
arguments on which they rely.5 =-
In most environmental lawsuits, the resource user's files con-
tain most of the data that will be at issue. Specifications for air 
and water pollution control devices, data regarding the quality 
and quantity of emissions from a factory, and the results of tests 
to determine the ecological effects of pesticides are but a few 
examples. If these data are not already in its files, the resource 
user usually has on its staff, or can hire, experts to develop the 
necessary information. All this information can be discovered by 
the environmental lawyer through a painstaking and time-con-
suming process of examining witnesses at depositions, framing 
precise written questions, and going through the resource user's 
files. 
Two factors sometimes stop conservationists from making the 
fullest use of these procedures. First, discovery is one of the most 
expensive parts of a lawsuit. Depositions require a great deal of 
lawyers' time, since there are often dozens of witnesses, whose 
depositions drag on for days. There may be substantial travel 
time and expense, since depositions are often held at widely 
scattered locations. Also, deposition reporters' fees for recording 
and transcribing can run into thousands of dollars. 
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Second, environmental lawsuits are often conducted in frantic 
haste, since they are usually started with the bulldozers poised 
to strike. If a judge orders a work halt, he has already stuck out 
his neck for the conservationists. Under those circumstances, 
resource users invariably demand an immediate trial, arguing 
that delay is costing them money, and the judge is almost bound 
to turn a deaf ear to conservationists' pleas for further delays in 
order to conduct discovery. 
Litigation by private citizens strengthens and hastens govern-
ment's anti-pollution efforts. This is one of the factors that con-
tributed to the recent decision by the Internal Revenue Service 
not to challenge the tax-deductible status of public-interest law 
firms doing environmental work.6 This is also the main goal of 
several recently-enacted statues authorizing citizen suits against 
polluters. Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 19707 
allows citizens to seek an injunction against any activity that 
threatens to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or natural 
resources of the state. The Federal Clean Air Act amendments of 
1970 authorizes citizen suits not only against firms violating air 
pollution standards and orders, but also against the Administra-
tor of the Environmental Protection Agency if he fails to carry 
out his enforcement duties under the Act. 8 
Litigation offers one final advantage. It cuts down, to some 
degree, the polluters' inherent superiority in terms of money, 
power, and influence. Lobbying is not an appropriate litigation 
technique and judges are not subject to the same types of pres-
sures that work on legislators. And, unlike most bureaucrats, 
judges are sometimes willing to listen to new arguments and act 
flexibly. 
But resorting to the courts presents serious drawbacks as a 
means for achieving environmental quality. Again, the prime 
difficulty is expense. Environmental lawsuits are often protracted, 
requiring hundreds of hours of lawyers' time. The controversy 
over the Storm King project, still raging, has been before the 
Federal Power Commission or the courts since 1964. Most con-
servationist attorneys are unpaid or accept sharply reduced fees 
for their services, but there is a limit to the amount of volunteer 
labor to be expected from even the most dedicated environment-
alist. There are other, large fixed expenses-secretarial and 
clerical assistance, court fees, bond premiums, and compensation 
for experts are a few examples. 
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These expenses are not so crushing to industry and govern-
ment as they are to the chronically underfinanced conservationist 
side. Government lawyers can call on the vast Justice Depart-
ment staff and, if necessary, the whole federal bureaucracy. 
Industry starts with an immense monetary advantage and, to 
make matters worse, its efforts are heavily subsidized. Litigation 
costs may be written off as a business expense, borne in part by 
the taxpayers. Public utilities, such as water and power com-
panies, receive a second subsidy from their customers, since 
their rates include a reserve for litigation expenses. This financial 
superiority enables industry to hire the best available lawyers 
and technical experts. It also may den y access for conserva tionists 
to the best technical assistance. In the Santa Barbara oil spill 
litigation, conservationist lawyers were hard-pressed to find 
an expert to advise them; most of the men they talked to were 
supported directly or indirectly by grants from the oil industry 
and were not about to jeopardize their future livelihood for the 
sake of ecology. 
Resource users' financial power poses another problem. Typi-
cally, they have a heavy investment in their ecologically un-
sound activities and, they are quick to point out, they provide 
jobs for many local residents. Closing down a polluting plant 
can cause serious economic losses for the polluter and consider-
able local unemployment. Judges are not eager to bring about 
this kind of result, even if the plant is ecologically disastrous. 
For instance, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement CO.,9 the court con-
ceded that clouds of dust produced by a cement plant were 
causing severe damage to neighboring property-owners and that 
the plant was a nuisance, as that term is understood at law. 
Despite a long-standing rule that a court must abate a nuisance 
that causes continuous and serious harm, the court refused to 
close down the plant, noting that the cement company had in-
vested $45 million and employed 300 people. The court did 
award "permanent damages," a hollow victory for the plaintiffs, 
who wanted clean air, not filthy lucre. 
The majority opinion in Boomer asserted another reason why 
it would not order and supervise a clean-up of the plant's opera-
tions. Although it acknowledged the serious nature of the air 
pollution problem and the urgent need to solve it, the court felt 
that the judiciary is not the proper institution to effect the 
needed changes: 
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A court should not try to do this on its own as a byproduct of 
private litigation, and it seems manifest that the judicial establish-
ment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it 
can pronounce nor prepared to lay down an effective policy for the 
elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference 
of one private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government 
and should not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute 
between property owners and a single cement plant-one of many-
in the Hudson River valley. 10 
The court passed the buck on the ground that it was un-
equipped to supervise a clean-up program. This premise is faulty. 
Judges should have no more trouble dealing with the complexities 
of pollution control technology than they have in anti-trust, 
malpractice, or other types of cases that involve technical sub-
jects. Indeed, in criminal cases, the courts frequently order a 
polluting firm to install designated pollution control devices 
according to a strictly-enforced timetable. For example, a 
Pennsylvania company was recently ordered to install two half-
million dollar precipitators within six months and to take interim 
steps, including limiting the use of certain boilers, and purchasing 
low ash-con ten t coal.ll 
But the Boomer opinion did point out a more serious drawback 
of the litigation process. The courts are empowered to deal only 
with the parties before them and with the issues that the parties 
choose to raise. They have no power to prescribe industry-wide 
changes of practice, to order public authorities to spend money, 
or even to decide what levels of pollution are tolerable. These, 
and most other questions of environmental policy, are political 
questions that must be decided by Congress, the state legisla-
tures, and administrative functionaries. 
Nor do the courts have the power to compel vigorous enforce-
ment of anti-pollution statutes. For example, the Refuse Act of 
1899 makes pollution of navigable streams a crime and instructs 
the Justice Department to prosecute violators "vigorously."12 
The courts have been eager to help enforce the Refuse Act, 
issuing a number of very favorable rulingsY Nonetheless, until 
last year there had been only a handful of prosecutions and only 
now, under great political pressure, has the Justice Department 
begun to implement a policy of systematic prosecution against 
viola tors.14 
Court victories in environmental cases are often transitory. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 571 
Environmentalists cheered the decision in the Scenic Hudson 
case mentioned earlier. But the Federal Power Commission, 
following a second round of hearings ordered by the court, again 
decided to license the Storm King hydro plant. And the Com-
mission had learned from its past mistakes. This time around, 
the FPC made sure that the record was replete with evidence that 
it have considered factors of environmental quality and scenic 
beauty-it made 376 detailed findings of fact in alJ.15 The chances 
of winning a second reversal appear dim. 
A similar result is possible in the Alaska Pipeline case.16 There, 
the court forbade the Secretary of Interior to issue a permit to 
construct a haul road or take gravel from public lands because 
it had not submitted an impact statement, as required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, discussed below. 
The decision effectively stopped the pipeline. But Interior has 
since submitted an environmental impact statement which con-
cludes that the pipeline should be built because it is vital for 
national defense. Conservationists were offered a small ray of 
hope when Rogers Morton, the newly appointed Secretary indi-
cated that he was not completely convinced of the need to build 
the pipeline; the hopes grew brighter when the Environmental 
Protection Agency also expressed reservations. 
In contrast, a court decision halting work on the Cross-Florida 
Barge CanaP7 spurred a decision by President Nixon to order a 
permament moratorium on construction to prevent "potentially 
serious environmental damages." Political decisions like this are 
usually far more permanent than court decisions. 
There is no single "best" type of lawsuit to combat pollution. 
Depending on the facts of the case, dozens of statutes or common 
law rules may be applicable. One method that appears particu-
larly promising is to sue under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969,18 A large number of NEPA actions have al-
ready been filed. NEPA declares a national policy of restoring 
and maintaining environmental quality and orders all federal 
agencies to submit detailed statements on the environmental 
effects of any projects they plan to undertake, permit, or finance. 
The provisions ofNEPA apply to virtually any activity with en-
vironmental impact, since federal approval or funding is almost 
always required. The Council on Environmental Quality has 
developed interim guidelines for the preparation of the environ-
mental impact statements. Among other things, the statements 
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must consider cumulative and long-range effects; alternative 
actions that might avoid adverse environmental effects; and ir-
reversible or irretrievable commitments of resources. 
The courts have already based several pro-environment de-
cisions on the provisions of NEPA. In the Cossatot River case,19 
the court ordered a halt to construction work on an Army Corps 
of Engineers dam that was sixty percent completed because the 
Corps' environmental impact statement was inadequate. Other 
courts have ruled that NEPA authorizes the Army Corps of 
Engineers to refuse a dredging permit for ecological reasons20 
and that an environmental impact statement under NEPA must 
be submitted before work on the Alaska Pipeline may continue.21 
A second opportunity is presented by the Refuse Act of 1899, 
a statute that declares pollution of navigable waters to be a 
crime and provides for fines of up to $2,500 per day. One half of 
those fines, at the discretion of the court, may be paid to "per-
sons giving information which shall lead to conviction."22 Re-
cently, environmental lawyers have been dusting off an ancient 
common law form called a qui tam action, permitting an informer 
to sue to collect a fine when a statute authorizes him to keep a 
portion of it. 
The Conservation and Natural Resources Subcommittee of 
the House Committee on Government Operations, chaired by 
Rep. Henry Reuss (D-Wis.), has issued a report on qui tam 
citizens actions under the Refuse Act. The report recommends 
that a citizen with information about refuse discharged into 
navigable waters should follow these procedures: 
1. Contact the Army Corps of Engineers to see if the Corps 
has issued a permit for the discharge, and if so, whether the 
permittee is complying with its terms. 
2. Submit an affidavit to the U.S. Attorney describing the 
nature, method, date, and place of the discharge, the name of 
the discharger, and a list of other possible witnesses. The 
affidavit should state that the Corps of Engineers has not issued 
a permit for the discharge, and that the receiving stream is 
navigable. If possible, photos and samples should be included. 
3. Request that the U.S. Attorney seek an injunction for-
bidding future discharges, requiring removal of prior discharged 
material, and ordering the discharger to apply for a permit from 
the Corps of Engineers. 
4. If no action is forthcoming, begin a civil qui tam suit in the 
U.S. District Court. 
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The short opinion by Judge Wyatt in U.S. v. Transit-Mix 
Concrete Corp.23 shows how dogged persistence may payoff in 
qui tam actions. The claimant in that case first noticed the de-
fendant dumping waste into the East River, New York City, 
from her window in April, 1968. She then began a long and frus-
trating series of telephone calls and letters to the Corps of Engi-
neers and U.S. Attorneys, who took no action for almost two 
years. Finally, prosecution was begun in March, 1970 and 
$25,000 in fines was collected. The court awarded half that amount 
to the claimant, despite the fact that the government had in-
formation about the discharges even before she first contacted 
the Corps of Engineers. But the court recognized that the claim-
ant's persistent campaign did, in fact, "lead to conviction," 
and therefore concluded she was entitled to half the fine. 
There is considerable doubt whether a qui tam action may 
be maintained if the government refuses to prosecute. In one 
case dealing with this question, a district judge dismissed a qui 
tam action because he did not want to be placed "in the awk-
ward position of determining priority between a criminal prose-
cution ... and a civil suit ... by an informant. It would be 
unreasonable to conclude that a court would entertain both 
actions simultaneously."24 
Another useful tool is the class action. One of the most serious 
problems in bringing environmental lawsuits is that the plaintiff's 
monetary damages are miniscule (if, indeed, there are any, at 
all). It has been estimated, for example, that air pollution costs 
the average American about $65 a year for increased cleaning, 
medical, and other expenses.25 The prospect of a $65 recovery 
is hardly likely to encourage the average lawyer to rush out and 
file an environmental law suit. But by bringing a class action, 
one individual may sue on behalf of all others similarly situated. 
The aggregate total of damages for the class is usually very large 
and provides a great incentive for lawyers to undertake such 
suits. 
An imaginative class action was recently brought by con-
servationists against Standard Oil of California.26 The suit 
arises out of a collision between two Standard tankers in San 
Francisco Bay that resulted in a massive oil spill. The plaintiffs 
seek to recover the resonable value of the services donated by 
thousands of volunteers who helped clean birds and beaches in 
the days after the spill. They claim that it was Standard's legal 
duty to clean up the mess caused by its negligence, that the 
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company could and should have foreseen that many Bay Area 
residents would react to the disaster by volunteering their 
labor, and that Standard should not be allowed to reap the ad-
vantage of that labor without payment. 
Only within the last few years have the courts been willing to 
accept the concept that environmental outrages are actionable. 
Because the field is so new (and the law is generally slow to 
change), conservationists must overcome various procedural 
hurdles just to persuade the court to hear their case. One such 
hurdle is the problem of "standing." Typically, the environ-
mental plaintiff is a conservation organization or individual who 
has suffered no real monetary damage. The defendant usually 
objects that such a plaintiff lacks "standing to sue," i.e., that 
because the plaintiff lacks a direct pecuniary interest in the suit, 
the court will be called on to render an unconstitutional advisory 
opinion. Another apparent danger is that the courts would be 
overrun by conservationists filing frivolous lawsuits. 
Objections of this type were rejected by a federal appeals 
court in two landmark decisions, Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conference v. Federal Power Commission27 and Citizens Committee 
for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe. 28 The court concluded that non-
economic interests, such as concern for the environment, are en-
titled to judicial protection, that conservationist groups with 
serious and long-standing interests in the area were proper guard-
ians of that concern, and that the large expense of environmental 
litigation would effectively discourage frivolous lawsuits. 
More than a dozen opinions have accepted the rationale of 
Scenic Hudson and Citizens Committee. But recently, the federal 
appeals court for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Sierra Club 
lacked standing to challenge a plan to construct a commercial 
ski resort development in Mineral King Valley, within the Se-
quoia National Game Refuge.29 In effect, the court decided that 
the Sierra Club had no legitimate interest in protecting the 
Sierras! The Supreme Court has agreed to review that ruling 
and conservationists are optimistic that it will be overturned. 
Another major problem is administrative delay. Many federal 
agencies empowered to make decisions of great environmental 
significance are usually hostile to conservationists and their point 
of view. One technique they have used quite successfully to 
thwart conservationists is to move as slowly as possible in response 
to their requests. Environmentalists then face a quandary, 
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since the courts usually refuse to review an agency's action until 
it has rendered a final decision. 
That was the situation in Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Hardin,30 a case in which the Department of Agriculture was 
asked to use its emergency powers to suspend immediately the 
interstate sale of DDT. Agriculture sat on the request, taking no 
action. But when conservationists sought judicial relief, the 
Department argued that the court should not take jurisdiction 
because it had not rendered its final decision yet. 
The court did not accept this argument. It asserted: "[W]hen 
administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the 
rights of the parties as a denial of relief, an agency cannot pre-
clude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of an 
order denying relief .... The suspension power is designed to 
protect the public from an 'imminent hazard'; if petitioners are 
right in their claim that DDT presents a hazard sufficient to 
warrant suspension, then even a temporary refusal to suspend 
results in irreparable injury on a massive scale. The controversy 
is ripe for judicial resolution ... " 
Despite the expense and difficulties of environmental litiga-
tion, this embryonic field has shown remarkable progress in a 
few short years. But judicial litigation can only be a stop-gap 
measure in the fight for environmental quality. It would be an 
unconscionable waste of resources if every issue of environmental 
policy had to be fought out in court. What is needed is a new 
ethic emphasizing harmony between man and nature and a 
new, workable institutional framework to implement such a 
policy. Neither can be achieved through the courts. Instead, we 
will require a massive process of re-educating the public and an 
intense political campaign to establish as one of our primary 
goal~ the maintenance of the earth as a fit habitat for the human 
specIes. 
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